Conclusions by Chirco
					, 
						Alessandra & Colombo
					, 
						Caterina
workers’ outside opportunities, that the latter are inversely correlated to the
rate of unemployment and, …nally, that the mark-up over outside opportunities
depends positively on the degree of market power on the product market. No-
tice that the reference to this non competitive framework opens the possibility
that a transmission mechanism of …scal policy, based on changes in product
demand elasticity, operates not only directly, via shifts in the PS schedule, but
also indirectly via induced shifts of the WS schedule.
In order to evaluate the e¤ectiveness of …scal policy on employment we fol-
low the same procedure developed in section 3, and obtain the employment
multiplier:
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To evaluate the sign of this multiplier, we again consider …rst the case in
which the elasticity of public demand is higher than that of private demand. If
° > ½, @­=@ eG = ­² ³@²=@ eG´ < 0 and @­=@eL = ­u ³@u=@eL´+­² ³@²=@eL´ >
0. This allows us to establish that if the conditions for the PS schedule to be
negatively sloped are veri…ed, then an expansionary …scal policy has a positive
e¤ect on employment. The PS curve shifts upwards and the overall e¤ect is
ampli…ed by a downward shift of a positively sloped WS schedule.
If ° < ½, @­=@ eG > 0 while @­=@eL is ambiguous in sign. If it is positive, so
that the WS is positively sloped, and if the PS is upward sloping as well, then
the above multiplier is positive, provided the WS intersects the PS from above
(it is ‡atter at equilibrium). This con…guration resambles that obtained above
in a competitive framework. In this case, however, we cannot easily rely upon
stability conditions. As noticed by Manning (1990), if both the labour and the
goods markets are non competitive, no equilibria can be assessed to be stable
or unstable, without a priori information on the degree of the nominal and real
price and wage rigidities. Finally, we notice that if the WS schedule turns out
to be negatively sloped, the multiplier is unambiguously positive.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have highlighted the properties of a macroeconomic model
with monopolistic competition, where the di¤erentiated goods which enter the
aggregate output basket are demanded and consumed by both the private and
the public sector, with di¤erent demand elasticities. In this set-up, the level
of public expenditure in‡uences the overall demand elasticity and the labour
demand schedule, through a direct ’demand composition’ e¤ect. In particular,
we have proved that an increase in public expenditure may increase output,
not only (as previously established) when public demand is more elastic than
private demand and returns are decreasing, or when it is less elastic and returns
are increasing. There is a set of technological conditions, from moderately in-
creasing to moderately decreasing returns, in which …scal policy is expansionary,
independently of the way in which it alters the elasticity of demand at the initial
equilibrium.
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With these results we aim at contributing to the research program which
views the degree of market power as a possible intermediate target for an
employment-oriented …scal policy (D’Aspremont et al. (1995)). Some authors
have stressed the di¢culties and risks involved in the actual implementation
of such a policy intervention (Jacobsen and Schultz (1994)). However it is by
now clear that the degree of market competitiveness plays a crucial role in the
determination of the level of macroeconomic activity, and this suggests that a
serious theoretical assessment of the market power e¤ect of …scal policy should
be carried out.
In this wider perspective, one can draw no de…nite conclusions, be them
theoretical or empirical, on the direction in which …scal policy may in‡uence the
degree of market power. In some sectors, the presence of a public component
of demand in addition to the private component may actually increase market
competitiveness; to quote an example, the rules recently imposed in Italy on
the government-…nanced purchases of pharmaceutical products may induce a
more competitive price behaviour on the …rms’ side. On the other hand, public
expenditure is somehow ”rigidly” allocated - the setting of expenditure in real
terms is often accompanied by a predetermination of its allocation between the
di¤erent sectors - and this contributes to making demand more rigid. Both
kinds of phenomena are consistent with our analysis.
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